The Shanghai Municipal Government's environmental complaints system allows citizens to report environmental problems to local authorities and provides timely feedback regarding how the complaint was resolved. Using both statistical data and case studies, we conduct a qualitative analysis of the system's costs and benefits as of early 2002. The analysis shows that the complaints system is an important, yet somewhat unreliable source of information about the many environmental problems not otherwise detected by regulators. Moreover, the opportunity cost of the system is significant; the system is dominated by nuisance complaints that are either trivial or without significance to environmental quality except at a very limited geographical scale. Analysis of patterns in the case studies provides the basis for constructing hypotheses concerning whether a particular pollution problem is likely to be the subject of a complaint. This offers insights into how the system could be improved so that the benefits of citizen involvement could be enhanced. This contribution presents a detailed case study of the Shanghai environmental complaints system. Governments in many countries see citizen complaints systems as an important source of information about the environment, especially when the government's resources for monitoring ambient environmental quality and gathering data on pollution sources are scarce.
24-hour telephone hotline called "Green 110" (lüse yao yao ling), which was established and is operated by the government.
This article includes a qualitative analysis of the benefits and costs of Shanghai's environmental complaints system as of early 2002. Because this analysis is qualitative, it is not able to determine definitively whether or not the benefits outweigh the costs. However, the analysis indicates the strengths and the shortcomings of the system, thereby providing a basis for recommending improvements. The key benefit of Shanghai's environmental complaints system is as a supplementary source of information about pollution discharges in Shanghai Municipality. As our analysis shows, the government's formal information collection systems in Shanghai are so limited in scope that the vast majority of enterprises operate outside the formal regulatory system. Therefore, citizen complaints, when they uncover violations not previously identified by the regulators, serve to enhance the government's control over pollution. In addition, our analysis shows that a secondary benefit of the complaints system is that it enhances government legitimacy by showing citizens that the government is focused on responding to the concerns of its citizens.
The costs of the system take the form of foregone opportunities associated with alternative use of resources needed to run the complaints system. These costs result primarily from the dominance of complaints about nuisance problems which divert inspection resources away from key environmental problems to issues such as noisy air conditioning motors on apartment buildings. In addition, many complaints reflect the low environmental awareness of citizens. The next section sets the stage by providing a brief description of Shanghai's environmental complaints system and introducing 14 case studies used in the empirical analysis. The following two sections use statistical data and evidence from the case studies to examine the benefits and costs of the complaints system. Finally, a typology of complaints is compiled from the case studies to further examine what types of pollution cases are likely to be reported on and what motivates citizens to report significant cases. This provides the basis for policy recommendations in the final section.
Shanghai's environmental complaints system
Complaints about the environment in Shanghai are commonly made in one or more of the following ways: a visit to a people's government, People's Congress, or environmental protection bureau (EPB) complaints office (xin fang ban gong China Information XXI (2)
shi)
2 during which the complaint is lodged in person; a letter sent to a complaints office (either within an EPB, or to the general complaints offices within the local people's government or People's Congress); a telephone call to a complaints hotline; or a private telephone call to an EPB or government official. These methods involve different levels of risk to the complainant, the lowest risk being offered by a telephone call, the highest by a letter. 3 The institutional framework for receiving environmental complaints in Shanghai Municipality is complex, and there are numerous offices at the municipal, district, and township levels of government at which environmental complaints may be lodged (refer to Figure 1 ). For example, at the municipal government level alone, complaints may be lodged at five different offices: the Shanghai Municipal People's Congress Environment Committee, the Shanghai Municipal People's Congress Letters and Visits Office, the Shanghai Municipal People's Government Letters and Visits Office, the Shanghai Environmental Protection Bureau (SEPB) Letters and Visits Office or the SEPB telephone hotline. Similar organizational units exist at the district and township level.
Complaints tend to start at the bottom of the bureaucratic hierarchy and work their way upwards. The Shanghai Municipal People's Congress Environment Committee (the Environment Committee) or the Shanghai Municipal People's Congress Letters and Visits Office, as the highest ranking offices in Shanghai Municipality at which complaints may be lodged, are generally only used as a last resort. Cadres at the People's Congress believe that citizens file complaints with the Congress if they think the township and district governments or municipal bureaus have failed to resolve their complaint satisfactorily. 4 Therefore, the Shanghai Municipal People's Congress receives relatively few environmental complaints (approximately 100-200 per year), 5 and these are concerned with serious environmental issues. In addition, many of the complaints that are referred to the highest levels of the Shanghai Municipal Government pertain to cross-jurisdictional issues that cannot be easily solved at lower levels of government, for example, pollution from an enterprise in one district that threatens the safety of municipal water supply in a neighboring district. 6 The majority of complaints about the environment in Shanghai are lodged at environmental protection bureaus. To accommodate the high volume of citizen complaints, SEPB and the district EPBs have each established internal structures and procedures to accept complaints. In some cases this includes a newly formed complaints department under the direction of the EPB 8 and in other cases, the task of accepting complaints is delegated to an existing internal department. 9 Letters, visits, and phone calls are accepted by this office, which is also responsible for arranging follow-up inspections by the EPB supervision station.
Nationwide, in the period between 1999 and 2001, many EPBs established 24-hour telephone hotlines to accept complaints.
10 Shanghai Municipality's environmental telephone hotline, Green 110, 11 started operation on 28 December 2000. 12 It is manned by the Shanghai Environmental Supervision Team (jiancha zhi dui).
13 Based on Shanghai's initial experience with Green 110, it appears that once a telephone hotline is set up, the majority of complaints are made through this channel.
14 Establishment of SEPB's Green 110 telephone hotline represents the most significant institutional change in Shanghai's environmental complaints system in recent years. According to Hong Hao, the former Director of SEPB, 15 Green 110 is "SEPB's most important enforcement tool." 16 It allows SEPB to efficiently collect complaints, locate problems, dispatch inspectors to the site (within 30 minutes), and commence enforcement proceedings against polluters. The Green 110 scheme is very modern and based on the police telephone receipt and dispatch used by the Shanghai Public Security Bureau. 17 The Green 110 control center houses a global information system (GIS) and global positioning system (GPS) computer network covering the whole municipality. 18 In addition to enabling a rapid dispatch of inspectors, the use of GIS allows the Green 110 control center's staff to quickly find the address at which the complainant identified the problem, and then search a database for nearby enterprises of a type that might be responsible for the discharge. This helps inspectors to narrow down the possible pollution sources before arriving at the scene.
19
Complaints lodged through Green 110 about environmental problems in the peri-urban areas are responded to in several ways. Most commonly, the Green 110 control center contacts the relevant district EPB's Green 110 inspection vehicle (under the direction of the district EPB supervision station) and requests that district EPB inspectors respond to the complaint. However, in some cases, the Green 110 control center may bypass the district EPB and dispatch the Shanghai Environmental Supervision Team inspectors instead.
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In addition to complaints received by the municipal authorities, and at Green 110, many complaints in Shanghai's peri-urban areas are lodged directly by citizens at district EPB complaints offices or with township environmental protection officers (EPOs). In most cases, complaints received at the township or district level are investigated by the township environmental protection officer 21 or district EPB supervision station inspectors, respectively.
To better understand the characteristics of citizen complaints in Shanghai, we conducted 14 case studies of enterprises in Shanghai Municipality against which environmental citizen complaints had been lodged (see Table  1 ). 22 These cases were identified during discussions with Green 110 and district EPB officials, primarily based on a list of registered textile enterprises in each district. 23 The sample is not representative inasmuch as a high fraction of the cases provided information about violations of environmental regulations, whereas statistics show that the majority of complaints are lodged about enterprises at which violations have not occurred. 24 However, these 14 cases illustrate important characteristics of complaints cases and they form the basis for our qualitative analysis of the costs and benefits of Shanghai's environmental complaints system.
The case studies show that complaints are lodged about a range of pollution situations. Some are long-term problems, and others are one-time violations or accidents. Ongoing problems uncovered through complaints include an enterprise's systematic failure either to operate its wastewater treatment equipment or to treat its waste in the approved manner. Two cases illustrate these outcomes. Case 7 is an enterprise that did not have its own on-site treatment equipment and failed to comply with its agreement to send wastewater to a neighboring enterprise for treatment (for a fee). Instead, the enterprise discharged untreated effluent into a local canal.
25 Case 9 is a chemical factory that stored highly toxic wastewater generated during the day, and waited until after dark to release it untreated into a local canal which flowed through a nearby village.
In addition, complaints sometimes uncover instances of one-time environmental violations that might not have been deliberate attempts to avert environmental regulations; for example, violations might have been due to accidents or short-term problems at a particular enterprise. For example, case 6 involves a complaint from a farmer whose ducks had died because of a diesel fuel spill from an enterprise located just upstream of the farm. Upon inspection, the local township environmental protection officer found that the spill was caused by a leak in a boiler-a relatively simple matter that could be fixed with improved maintenance.
Benefits of a complaints system
The rise of a decentralized, largely market-driven industrial sector, particularly in China's rapidly urbanizing peri-urban areas, has been one of the most dramatic consequences of China's post-1978 economic reforms. These peri-urban areas house many small-scale enterprises, and are increasingly becoming the recipients of large enterprises relocated from core city areas. The sheer number of enterprises, particularly small-scale enterprises, in these areas is staggering: the total number of primary, secondary, and tertiary sector small-scale enterprises in towns and villages in China was over 23 million in 1997. 27 Of these, 6.6 million were classified as industrial small-scale enterprises. 28 This represents a dramatic increase from the 800,000 small-scale industrial enterprises registered in 1978. In the late 1990s, small-scale industrial enterprises contributed approximately 40% of the total value of industrial output in China. 29 Enforcement of environmental regulations at these enterprises is primarily the responsibility of county and district EPBs.
The vast industrial sector in peri-urban areas provides an enormous challenge to China's environmental regulators who suffer from a lack of resources and effective regulatory tools to meet that challenge. The most basic tool required by any regulator is information, and the poor state of China's environmental information system is striking. Research on the periurban districts of Shanghai Municipality has shown that SEPB and district EPBs focus their formal data gathering and enforcement activities on large and medium-sized enterprises, and they are able to monitor and inspect less than 30% of registered small-scale enterprises in Shanghai's peri-urban districts. 30 In other words, the government in Shanghai collects no environmental information about more than 70% of small-scale enterprises: the activities of these enterprises would be unknown to SEPB and the EPBs if it were not for citizen complaints.
An additional shortcoming of the EPBs' formal information system is that while small-scale enterprises, which largely respond to market conditions, can be relatively volatile during their production characteristics, the list of enterprises at which data is formally gathered by EPBs is quite static, changing little from year to year. 31 While locked into a formalized information gathering system that was established by national regulation during the planned economy era-a time during which industrial enterprise characteristics were more static than under today's market economy 32 -EPBs are generally not able to respond quickly to the changing environmental conditions at small-scale enterprises, and many problems go undiscovered by EPBs.
A citizen complaints system provides EPBs with an additional tool for gathering information about the environmental performance of enterprises. The primary benefit of a complaints system from the perspective of data gathering is that it is not restricted to the formal information systems of the government; citizens can complain about any problems that they perceive, not just those at China Information XXI (2) enterprises which are already under government scrutiny. Thus, such a system has the potential to significantly broaden the reach of environmental monitoring. Officials interviewed in SEPB and the district EPBs supported Shanghai's complaints system, because they do believe it supplements their limited formal data collection. 33 There are many notable cases in Shanghai in which citizen complaints have alerted government officials to environmental problems that had been previously undetected by the government.
Consider, for example, case 1 (in Table 1 ), which involves a textile enterprise located in Shanghai's Upper Huangpu River Protection Zone (hereafter called the Protection Zone). 34 The enterprise released bright red wastewater into a small canal that flowed directly through a village. A complaint was lodged by a former worker of the enterprise. Case 9 provides a second example. In this instance, a chemical factory was discharging highly toxic wastewater at night. The complainant was a worker at the factory who knew of its wastewater discharge practices.
Another benefit of a complaints system from the perspective of China's semi-authoritarian government is that government legitimacy is enhanced when the government provides citizens with a controlled outlet for voicing their concerns. Since 1989, the central government has established an institutional and legal framework to allow citizens to lodge complaints about a range of policy areas, and it has publicly encouraged complaints. 35 All local governments must establish a system to accept citizen complaints about the environment. 36 Complaints systems in China typically do not encourage citizens to challenge the legitimacy of state policies; environmental complaints systems enable citizens to report: (1) illegal or inadequate implementation of laws by local environmental protection officials; or (2) disregard for laws by enterprises or private citizens.
China's modern complaints systems are in keeping with a centuries-old Chinese bureaucratic tradition of providing government-controlled outlets that allow citizens to voice their concerns about the actions of the government or other issues (as the contribution by Ho-fung Hung elsewhere this volume has also shown). 37 Moreover, as Susan Lawrence argues, they provide a "safety valve" for Chinese citizens dissatisfied with the actions of government officials:
A seldom noted legacy of those events [i.e. mass demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in June 1989], however, has been the party's [refers to the Chinese Communist Party, CCP] quiet effort to give the public new outlets to vent their frustrations with the system. 38 In the field of environmental protection, these political benefits of environmental citizen complaints systems have been noted by officials within local government. For example, Fang Hongqing, an official at the Shantou Municipal EPB in Guangdong Province, in an article in the State Environmental Protection Agency's journal Huanjing baohu (Environmental protection), commented, "Citizen participation strengthens government relevance, openness of government policies, and shows that the government's policies satisfy the wishes of the citizens." 39 In our interviews in Shanghai, a senior official from the Shanghai Municipal People's Congress Environment Committee reinforced the notion that a complaints system can support government legitimacy. He described the Shanghai Municipal Government's attitude towards Shanghai's environmental complaints system as follows:
The [environmental] complaints system shows that the government is taking enforcement seriously, and it shows that environmental protection is a real law in Shanghai. The people want the government to enforce the laws, and this system shows that the government supports their concerns, which gives the people a good feeling. Also, people think that they are helping the government, which is satisfying for them. Of course, sometimes people just ring the hotline to make sure someone is actually there!
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Whether or not the acceptance of complaints from citizens actually does increase government legitimacy in the eyes of the public is unclear, but based on our interviews, officials at all levels of the Shanghai environmental protection administration believe this to be true and perceive it as a benefit of the system.
The costs of a complaints system
While Shanghai's citizen complaints system provides EPBs with information about the environmental performance of enterprises and potentially boosts government legitimacy, it also requires additional work by EPB staff; complaints that are lodged must be investigated. Our analysis of data from complaints indicates that the complaints system primarily yields information about two possible situations: violations of environmental laws by enterprises; and nuisance problems that have an impact on individual citizens, but which do not have a wider significance for environmental enforcement. Nuisance complaints cannot be avoided in a complaints system. However, for the benefits of the system to outweigh the costs to the government, complaints about minor nuisance issues should not dominate. During our research in 2001, we China Information XXI (2) examined the printed records representing calls from three days of operation of the Green 110 hotline. The majority of these reports concerned nuisance complaints, primarily noise from air conditioning motors on apartment buildings. Discussions with the Green 110 officials revealed that the printed records examined by Warwick were, in their view, "typical." Table 2 . Significantly, over 19,000 calls (68% of all calls received) were either unrelated to environmental protection or did not concern issues requiring enforcement and therefore did not result in EPB inspections. Examples of these types of calls include reports of blocked drains or problems with plumbing, or calls offering only opinions or suggestions regarding potential environmental improvements in Shanghai Municipality or elsewhere in China. 42 Citizens often use the Green 110 hotline as the first place to call with these type of complaints or suggestions because they are unaware of the correct location for lodging such calls. In the event that a call is received concerning issues outside the jurisdiction of SEPB, the control center staff provide alternative telephone numbers to the caller. General suggestions for environmental improvement are logged and passed to SEPB.
Another notable aspect of Table 2 is that of the nearly 28,000 calls received by the Green 110 control center in its first year of operation, only 3,384 separate issues were inspected by the Shanghai Environmental Supervision Team and district EPB supervision stations. 43 Significantly, of these inspections, in only 430 cases was the factory eventually found to be violating environmental laws and thus the source of a formal fine (fa kuan). The small number of illegal activities uncovered by the system is striking and there are two possible explanations for why nearly 28,000 calls led to only 430 fines. First, members of the general public are unable to differentiate between pollution discharges that violate environmental laws and regulations, and discharges that comply. 44 As an official in the District B EPB stated, "Citizens want the impact from pollution to disappear, but even if everything was according to the standards, there would still be some pollution. EPBs can't stop this."
45 Therefore, complaints often simply bring to light enterprises that discharge pollutants within the limits of the law.
Second, the number of cases reported as violations only refers to cases in which the action of the enterprise was illegal (wei fa). In contrast with Western systems, the words "legal" and "illegal" are not antonyms and mutually exclusive in Chinese environmental law. According to China's procedural laws, 46 acts fall into one of three categories: (1) acts that do not contravene any laws or standards and are therefore legal acts (he fa); (2) acts that contravene laws are considered illegal and are subject to formal fine; and (3) other acts that violate rules and may invoke monetary penalties such as fees or taxes, but are defined as "nonillegal" acts (bu wei fa). In accordance with State Council regulations on China's discharge fee program, noncompliance with the discharge standards is not considered to be an illegal action as defined by Chinese law. Fees may be imposed for noncompliance, but these are considered to be taxes rather than fines. Therefore, of the 3,384 issues identified by complaints that led to inspections but did not uncover illegal activities, some may pertain to enterprises discharging over the standards, but not conducting acts defined as illegal. Using the language of Chinese procedural law, these acts violated standards but were "nonillegal." 47 In summary, the data in Table 2 illustrates the high costs-in terms of EPB staff time-of the Green 110 complaints system: nearly 28,000 calls resulted in 3,384 inspections, but only 430 illegal acts were discovered. This data, together with our interviews with officials in SEPB and the district EPBs, indicate that EPB staff within Shanghai respond to a large number of complaints concerning trivial matters. Because new staff were not provided for EPBs to respond to complaints, there is an attendant potential for diverting inspection and enforcement resources away from important environmental problems, towards minor nuisance issues raised by citizens. 48 As highlighted by our case studies, the potential diversion of resources is significant because China Information XXI (2) many notable environmental problems remain unreported for long periods of time, even in jurisdictions having a well-established complaints system.
Complaints about dangerous, yet unobservable cases of pollution (for example, colorless and odorless pollution discharges) are often not reported in China. The public does not have access to enough information to know what an enterprise is manufacturing or discharging, and thus it is difficult for citizens to predict which particular enterprises may be causing problems, especially when these problems are not evident to the senses. Under China's environmental regulations, all production and environmental information about enterprises is kept secret. 49 This contrasts sharply with the situation in the United States, where, for example, firms are required by law to declare to the US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) their use and storage of hazardous substances on their sites. This information is compiled in the Environmental Protection Agency's Toxics Release Inventory, and is available to the public. 50 As another example, discharge monitoring data compiled by the US Environmental Protection Agency for point sources of air and water pollution can be accessed by individual citizens. This type of public domain information is invaluable in assisting citizens and environmental groups in understanding what local enterprises are doing and in identifying potential polluters, especially when the pollution is not self-evident.
Cases 1 and 9 provide examples. In both cases a complaint was eventually lodged, but this only occurred several years after the enterprise started violating discharge standards, and in both cases the complaint was lodged by a worker at the enterprise, not by a local citizen. In case 1, which involved a bright red wastewater released into a small canal that flowed directly through a village, the discharge continued for two years before any complaint was made, and even then, the complaint was lodged by a disgruntled worker who had been fired by the enterprise manager. The complaint was not made by residents of the local village, even though the pollution was evident and residents were adversely affected. In case 9, in which the enterprise discharged colorless, odorless toxic wastewater at night, the complaint was lodged by a worker at the factory who knew of its wastewater discharge practices.
These cases illustrate the limitations of an environmental complaints system as an information source. More generally, it is not uncommon for widely known violations of environmental laws to go unreported by citizens for years. Many of our interviews with factory managers and staff in Shanghai's peri-urban areas revealed that numerous violations were common and well known. For example, during our interviews in 2001 at an enterprise located in the Protection Zone, 51 the enterprise manager stated that it was well known amongst enterprise personnel that several electroplating enterprises in his general area were operating in 2001 in the Protection Zone, even though electroplating had been banned for almost 20 years in that location.
Further, even when pollution is evident to citizens, they may or may not be motivated to complain about it to authorities. Based on our case study data, we hypothesize that a citizen's propensity to complain is generally reduced if the enterprise causing the problem is important to the local village or town economy, and if the complaint is likely to lead to a significant enforcement action and possibly high costs for the enterprise. Citizens are more likely to complain about enterprises that cause them harm if the enterprises are located in a different village or town, or if the solution to the problem is not expected to cause a significant impact on the local economy.
The lack of complaints about many important environmental problems and the overloading of the system with minor nuisance complaints are important for two reasons. First, high-level EPB officials have come to view complaints systems as important sources of information, and in many cases they fail to recognize the limitations of the system. In the words of one district EPB director in Shanghai, "The environmental awareness of citizens is now high. We believe they would report any environmental problems they saw."
52 In short, the view expressed by many high-level environmental protection officials in Shanghai is: "if there is no complaint, there must be no problem." 53 Second, building on arguments presented by other researchers, we find that the important information that the complaints system yields comes at a significant cost to SEPB and the district EPBs. The complaints system skews the allocation of monitoring and enforcement resources towards pollution problems that are identifiable by the physical senses, and these problems are not necessarily the ones of greatest potential environmental impact or danger to citizens. Therefore, even though many complaints involve trivial matters (for example, noise from air conditioning motors placed in inappropriate locations outside residential buildings), SEPB and the district EPBs are obligated by Shanghai Municipal Government to investigate these complaints simply because they have been made, not because they represent important environmental issues. Thus, the complaints system prompts EPBs to reallocate already constrained resources towards issues that are not of significance to Shanghai as a whole. In many instances, resolution of the problem may improve the quality of life of individual complainants without having a notable effect on the environment of the Municipality. Table 3 shows the staffing of SEPB and Shanghai's district EPBs during the period 1997-2001 in which the complaints system was established. This data shows that the total staffing resources of the Shanghai EPB system did not increase during that four-year period. However, the number of staff allocated to the municipal and district supervision stations, which are responsible for enterprise inspections and responding to complaints, increased dramatically. This represents a significant internal reallocation of staffing resources.
The allocation of environmental protection resources in response to the wishes of the public is not unique to China. Moreover, notwithstanding the views of many experts, some would argue that it is entirely appropriate to allocate resources for enforcing environmental regulations in ways that are consistent with the preferences of citizens. An example from the United States illustrates the tensions between the perspectives of experts and citizens. In a 1987 US Environmental Protection Agency report called Unfinished Business: A Comparative Assessment of Environmental Problems, 54 Agency staff noted that "how the public perceives the seriousness of different environmental problems is very important to the setting of [US] EPA priorities." 55 The results of the analysis showed that the ranking that citizens gave for the significance of a range of environmental issues did not match the US Environmental Protection Agency staff 's ranking, which was based on risk assessments conducted by environmental scientists. However, the Agency's allocation of its own resources aligned more closely with the public's ranking than the risk assessment-based ranking completed by the Agency's own experts.
A few years later, the US Environmental Protection Agency tried to move its priority setting for environmental enforcement so that it relied more heavily on results of risk assessments performed by experts. 56 According to Richard Andrews, the US Environmental Protection Agency could only go a limited distance with this expert-based approach because its priorities were largely controlled by a number of fragmented statutes and court-imposed deadlines. Moreover, critics raised fundamental doubts about having enforcement priorities established by "an EPA sub-government rather than by a broader political process." 57 It is common in many countries for political processes to play a key role in setting enforcement priorities. For example, in the first few years of the presidential administration of George W. Bush, critics argued that the US Environmental Protection Agency experienced the largest enforcement rollback in the history of the agency. 58 Bush administration officials countered that their environmental enforcement approach reflected pressures on the overall federal budget and the realities of reallocating US Environmental Protection Agency resources to homeland security activities following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.
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While a detailed comparison of approaches to enforcement priority setting in the US and China is beyond the scope of this contribution, it is clear that efficiency in the allocation of enforcement resources is not the only decision criterion used in either country-public opinion plays a significant role.
Typology of complaints
The preceding discussion shows that Shanghai's environmental complaints system is beneficial to the Shanghai government because some violations previously unknown to SEPB and the district EPBs are uncovered by citizen complaints. However, the discussion has also shown that there are costs resulting from the system because it is an imperfect tool for gathering information. This is largely because of the nature of the environmental problems and the relationship between the local residents-the people most directly affected by pollution emissions from small-scale enterprises-and the sources of the environmental problems. Citizens often do not recognize the problems. And, even if they do, they may not complain about problems even when they are aware of them and know where and how to register complaints.
To explain why this is the case, we have classified complaints into five types based on cases examined in our study. Table 4 summarizes the key characteristics of the five types of complaints. This typology can be viewed as constituting hypotheses: the variables in Table 4 provide a basis China Information XXI (2) for estimating whether a complaint by a citizen is likely in a particular situation. It is likely that the variables used in this typology would be generally applicable in other locations, even outside China. The variables describe the complainant's relationship with the pollution problem (that is, can they sense it? do they suffer harm from it?) and the source of the pollution (namely, is the pollution from an enterprise that is important to the local economy, and is it likely that the citizens in the area would suffer economic hardship from action against the enterprise?). These are generic variables that are likely to be relevant to other complaints situations. However, because we derived the hypotheses from the cases in Table  1 , they cannot be viewed as having been tested in any sense. Testing would require additional case-study work.
Type A: pollution not evident to citizens
Type A represents cases in which a complaint is unlikely because the pollution being discharged is colorless and odorless, and therefore not observable by citizens. Clearly citizens cannot complain about problems of which they are unaware. However, this type of case is important because of SEPB and the district EPBs' reliance on the complaints system as a key source of information about significant environmental pollution issues. Colorless, odorless, highly toxic discharges are dangerous, but citizens are unlikely to report them because they are not self-evident, and thus citizens are unlikely to realize that these dangerous discharges are occurring. In some exceptional instances, an insider at an enterprise may report the problem to authorities. However, in general, pollution that is not evident to the senses is most reliably identified through a formal government monitoring and inspection program based on technical knowledge of the enterprise's production processes and likely pollution outputs. Case 9 illustrates a circumstance in which an enterprise discharging colorless, odorless pollution was the subject of a citizen complaint. However, notwithstanding that a complaint was lodged, this case is not inconsistent with our typology because the complaint was made by an enterprise worker who had technical knowledge of the pollution discharge. The extent of the information provided to Green 110 during the complaint call makes it obvious that the complainant was an insider. 60 This person knew of the discharge through her own work at the factory-she did not have to rely on observation of the local environment to detect it. Thus she was in a position to complain whereas local residents were not. This case involved a chemical factory that released highly toxic waste into a local canal at night. The complainant requested to remain anonymous, and therefore information about her motives is limited, but our review of the recording of the complaint call indicates that the worker felt morally obligated to call the authorities. As a technically trained person, the worker was aware of the hazardous nature of the discharge and was concerned about possible effects on a nearby village. Also, the complainant believed that the enterprise was economically strong, and therefore there was no reason for the enterprise not to do its "civic duty" and control waste. 61 In summary, type A cases are potentially serious because the pollution, which may be highly toxic and extremely dangerous, is impossible for ordinary citizens to detect and then complain about. Complaints, if they are lodged, may come from workers at the enterprise. However, workers are an unreliable source of complaints, and we expect that many pollution cases that fall into this category would not be detected by the complaints system, even when they involve significant sources of pollution.
Type B: pollution from economically significant enterprise causing evident harm to nearby resident
For type B cases, the pollution from the enterprise is evident to nearby residents, but they are not likely to complain because of the economic significance of the enterprise. Case 1 provides an illustration. In 1989, the enterprise had been established as a collective textile enterprise owned by the village government, and at that time it had built a wastewater treatment plant and satisfied the "three synchronizations" (san tongshi) requirements. 62 The enterprise went bankrupt and closed in the mid-1990s, but it reopened again in 1998 after the village government finally succeeded in attracting a private entrepreneur to invest in the factory. When the enterprise reopened, the products were different and production increased dramatically. However, the district EPB was not notified that the factory had reopened, and the expanded enterprise did not undergo procedures to satisfy the three synchronizations requirements. Its original treatment equipment was inadequate. The enterprise is located within 500 meters of the village residential area, on the opposite bank of a small canal that runs through the village. Water in the canal is used by villagers for washing and other household purposes, not including drinking water supply. From 1998 onwards, the factory discharged significant quantities of bright red wastewater into the canal.
Notwithstanding the impacts, local residents did not complain. Eventually, complaints were lodged by a former employee of the enterprise who had been fired. Based on information provided to the District A EPB when the complaint was made, the complainant held a grudge against the enterprise because he felt the factory manager had treated him unfairly. 63 In China, few avenues exist for labor protection. Therefore, while the real issue for the worker was apparently labor-related, the environmental complaints system was used to seek revenge. Simply lodging a complaint guaranteed that the enterprise would be subjected to follow-up action by the district government.
From 1998, when the enterprise reopened, to 2000, when the first complaint was lodged by the fired worker, no complaints from the village residents had been received by either the Township II environmental protection officer or the District A EPB. 64 Residents apparently tolerated the enterprise's release of bright red wastewater for two years and may have continued to tolerate it if the former worker's complaint had not been lodged. Why did the residents not register a complaint against the enterprise?
Our explanation for cases of this type recognizes that small-scale enterprises are often the cornerstone of local village and township economies. According to the township environmental protection officer interviewed for this case, this enterprise was the most important in the village economy, and the reopening of the enterprise after its initial bankruptcy had been a major event.
65 Indeed, when an unannounced visit was made to the factory by Warwick, together with the Township II environmental protection officer and a senior official from the District A EPB Supervision Station, the village Party secretary arrived at the factory within 10 minutes of the group's arrival, obviously tipped off by employees at the factory that environmental authorities were making an inspection.
Type B cases represent situations in which the pollution is evident and local residents suffer impact from the pollution, but residents do not complain because the local economy (and possibly their own employment) is dependent on the polluting enterprises. As a result of this reluctance to complain about economically significant local enterprises, many notable pollution problems are likely to remain unreported.
Local protection of enterprises limits the usefulness of the complaints system, but this does not imply that residents never complain about pollution problems in their own or neighboring villages and towns. As shown in the following section, there are three circumstances in which local residents are likely to make complaints.
Type C: pollution from enterprise causing evident harm to residents in a different town or village
This type of complaint involves cases where the pollution is evident, the polluting enterprise is located in a different village or town from the one in which the complainant lives, and residents suffer evident harm from the impacts of the pollution. Based on our assessment of the case studies, a complaint is likely in these circumstances because the complainant is in a different village or town. Individual village and town economies in China are not well integrated with each other; frequently, only enterprises within a village directly support the village government and local economy. 66 Thus, a complainant in a different town or village is unlikely to suffer economic hardship by making a complaint.
Case 3 is illustrative. The enterprise, located in Township II, was a textile factory, initially established as a domestically funded village enterprise. While the factory was being established, the enterprise satisfied the requirements of the three synchronizations program and its wastewater treatment facilities were accepted by the District A EPB. However, several years later, the enterprise became a foreign joint venture and expanded production but did not upgrade its wastewater treatment equipment. It discharged into a canal that flowed through another village. Residents of this village complained to the Township II People's Government (where the enterprise was located) about the impact on their local canal. However, time passed and the residents did not believe that the Township II People's Government had the resolve to force the enterprise to comply with environmental regulations. Consequently, more complaints were lodged, this time with the District A EPB and the District A People's Congress. 67 These two organizations made joint inspections of the site, and the final result was that the District A People's Congress requested that the District A People's Government close the enterprise. The enterprise was shut down in late 2000. 68 The characteristic of this case that distinguishes it from Type B cases is that the complainants did not live in the same village as the enterprise, and therefore their community was not reliant on that enterprise for its financial well-being. Complaints by local residents were more likely because these residents would not be affected by economic hardships the enterprise faced as a result of the complaint. In addition, resolution of the complaint ultimately required intervention by a higher-level authority, the district government, because the township government where the enterprise was located did not respond promptly to complaints lodged by citizens of the neighboring town.
The final two types of complaints involve special circumstances in which residents of a village do complain about pollution caused by enterprises within their own village.
Type D: pollution from enterprise causing evident, easily eliminated harm to nearby residents For Type D complaints, an enterprise's pollution has created a significant nuisance impact for residents in the same village, but resolution of the pollution problem has little, if any, economic impact on the enterprise. In this case, residents are likely to complain to authorities, and engage the district EPB's assistance as mediator to resolve the problem.
In case 2, the complaint involved an easily resolvable problem. A residential apartment building was located beside the enterprise, and residents of the apartments complained to the district EPB that they were being awakened at night when workers on the night shift made too much noise when walking between the canteen and the factory workshop. The district EPB's solution to the problem included requiring the factory to seal the canteen (namely, put glass in the windows) and put up signs to remind workers not to talk when walking between buildings at night. This was a nuisance issue, it was not an important environmental problem, and the solution had no notable financial impact on the enterprise.
We hypothesize that in a case involving a significant nuisance impact but having a simple solution, residents are likely to lodge complaints even when the factory is located in their own town or village. In this type of case, citizens use the EPBs to mediate solutions to their problems.
Type E: pollution from enterprise causing evident, severe harm to nearby residents
The final type of complaint-Type E-is also one where complainants are residents of the same village or town as the enterprise. However, in contrast with Type D, these cases involve incidents where the residents suffer a severe adverse impact as a result of an enterprise's waste discharge. In this situation, residents complain to authorities in order to gain compensation for the damage they have incurred even if the complaint may yield adverse economic effects for the local enterprise.
Case 11 provides an example. In this case, fish held in stationary enclosures in a river were killed by a highly concentrated organic discharge released China Information XXI (2) from a pig farm. The farm deliberately chose not to operate its treatment equipment, and instead released a large quantity of untreated wastewater from its holding tank, bypassing the treatment process. 69 As a result of the fish dying, the complainants suffered a major hardship, and thus they went to authorities. As this case suggests, severe personal loss can override a complainant's consideration of the local economic situation.
Conclusions
This contribution has used a qualitative benefit/cost framework to examine Shanghai's environmental complaints system. The analysis has shown that this system offers significant benefits: the environmental citizen complaints system in Shanghai Municipality is effective at uncovering information not previously known to EPBs about some self-evident pollution emissions from industrial enterprises. Also, from the perspective of high-level municipal officials, the complaints system is valuable because it provides citizens with the opportunity to observe that the government is responsive to their concerns. For many of these officials, the complaints system's use in enhancing the legitimacy of the government is one of its principal functions.
However, the costs of the system are not insignificant because most complaints concern relatively minor nuisance complaints. Moreover, the system is unable to identify in a timely or consistent manner some of the most important environmental violations that are also not uncovered by the formal discharge data-gathering program run by EPBs. Our typology of complaints proposes a series of explanations for this outcome. First, because of the lack of publicly available data about enterprises in China environmental awareness is low, and citizens do not recognize many violations. Second, many citizens are not motivated to report evident pollution from enterprises when their communities rely on the enterprises for jobs and revenue. Moreover, the opportunity cost of a system that responds to complaints simply because they have been lodged can be high. Citizens, as opposed to environmental professionals, are put in key positions to influence the allocation of resources for environmental monitoring and enforcement, and often (in Shanghai) those resources are devoted to investigating minor local nuisance issues.
We do not argue against the value of citizen participation in environmental protection. On the contrary, the establishment of a complaints system is an important step towards greater transparency and citizen involvement in environmental protection in China. However, the Shanghai complaints system could be improved by several policy and operational changes. First, the basic information system used for regulatory purposes should be the government's formal system; a citizen complaints system should only be viewed as an enhancement to that system, not the core of the system itself. The Shanghai Municipal Government should therefore first strengthen and expand SEPB and the district EPBs' formal environmental data-gathering programs. For example, the list of enterprises at which data is formally collected should not remain static over time. Instead, EPBs should amend and update this list according to the changing activities of the enterprises by obtaining access to as much independent data on the activities of the industrial enterprises as possible. In Shanghai Municipality, significant quantities of data are available from the municipality's commercial registration authorities, but this important source of information is generally not accessed by SEPB or the district EPBs. Using this source of data as the basis for the formal information collection programs would reduce the need to rely on the citizen complaints system to identify new and changing industrial conditions and new environmental problems.
Second, greater efficiency could be obtained by separating responsibility for investigation of noise and other nuisance complaints from the work of the main environmental inspection teams, as has been done already in at least one municipality in China. 70 In that municipality, the EPB employed a group of retirees in an "urban management" unit; total costs to staff in this unit were very low. When calls are made to the environmental hotline, minor nuisance calls are sent to the urban management unit for follow-up. This relieves the EPB inspection team from carrying out time-consuming inspections involving minor issues. EPB inspectors only followed up in cases where there were water or air pollution control problems.
Finally, the effectiveness of the citizen complaints system as a source of environmental information would be further enhanced by increasing the public's environmental awareness and access to information. In recent years, the central government has been testing environmental disclosure programs that rate enterprises on a 1 to 5 scale, and then disclose the results to the local public. Examples include work in Jiangsu Province and Inner Mongolia. The results of those pilot tests are encouraging, because they indicate that public disclosure can improve citizen awareness of environmental issues and focus their attention on important environmental problems. 71 Our qualitative framework for evaluating citizen complaints systems in China includes two principal benefits: gains in information to EPBs and China Information XXI (2) increases in the perceived legitimacy of government that result because of the government's demonstrated responsiveness to citizens' concerns. The costs in our assessment framework relate to the opportunities foregone by using limited environmental enforcement resources to follow up on all citizen complaints, many of which involve minor nuisance issues of no great consequence in terms of overall environmental quality.
Notes
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